Multilateral Principles in a Bilateral World Mandatory or Consensual Multilateralism in International Investment Law? by Mistelis, L & Rao, G
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.
brill.com/iric
Focus: Investment Arbitration and Its Contribution to 
the Development of International Law
∵
Multilateral Principles in a Bilateral World 
Mandatory or Consensual Multilateralism in International Investment Law?
Loukas Mistelis 
Clive M Schmitthoff Professor of Transnational Commercial Law and 
Arbitration, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London, Lincoln’s Inn 
Fields, London, United Kingdom
l.mistelis@qmul.ac.uk
Giammarco Rao 
School of International Arbitration at the Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, Queen Mary University of London, London, United Kingdom
g.rao@qmul.ac.uk
Abstract
Multilateralism in international investment law is a multifaceted concept with 
a complex and eventful history. Multilateralism is a paradigm for international 
investment relations and is also present in the caselaw of investment arbitral tribunals, 
regardless of whether they consider bilateral or multilateral investment treaties. 
Indeed, in most cases, they interpret treaty provisions as part of a multilateral system. 
Further, multilateralism is present every time States act in concert with other States or 
consider other States’ investors’ legitimate interests.
It also emerges that, in some instances, multilateralism has become mandatory. For 
example, this is the case concerning sustainable development or climate change. In 
these areas, international law requires multilateralism. States are under an obligation 
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to co-operate for purposes of achieving or promoting multilateral solutions. However, 
concerning the international investment law context, such a concept is not present. 
The general assumption is that States’ participation in multilateral practises is left 
to their discretion: it is voluntary or consensual. In this article, we question that 
assumption.
In this article, we offer a brief review of multilateral experiences in international 
investment law in the 20th century and provide an analysis of multilateralism in a 
historical context. Then we turn our attention to the current state of affairs to appreciate 
it in light of the past. Further, we discuss the future, and in particular, mandatory 
multilateralism in international law with respect to sustainable development. Here 
we identify the principles, which might justify mandatory multilateral approaches. 
Finally, we consider whether the principles justifying mandatory multilateralism in 
international law are applicable in the context of international investment law as well. 
We attempt to answer this question in the affirmative and point out further areas of 
research.
Keywords
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multilateralism – mandatory multilateralism – history – contextualism – international 
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1 Introduction
Multilateralism in international investment law is a multifaceted concept with 
a complex and eventful history. Perhaps it is that very history that renders this 
concept so rich in different meanings. After all, as argued by Nietzsche, “only 
that which has no history can be defined”.1 Multilateralism is one paradigm for 
international investment relations.2 That is the case, in particular, for interna-
tional lawyers who represent the view that international investment law is a 
uniform legal field and discipline.3 At the same time, and as things stand, the 
1 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, London, 2013, p. 81.
2 Schill, “Ordering Paradigms in International Investment Law: Bilateralism—
Multilateralism—Multilateralization”, in Douglas, Pauwelyn, and ViÑuales (eds.), The 
Foundations of International Investment Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 109 ff., pp. 109–141.
3 See for example, Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Cambridge, 
2009; Chalamish, “The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A de facto Multilateral 
Agreement?”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 303; Montt, State Liability 
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content and primary sources of international law are multiple and often mul-
tilateral. They include treaties, which are international instruments, and cus-
tomary international law. From an international coordination perspective the 
multilateral character of treaties is undisputable.4 Perhaps, more interestingly, 
even bilateral treaties do contain provisions that reflect multilateral princi-
ples.5 Customary international law is no doubt multilateral too: it arises from 
state practice and opinio juris.6 Along the same lines, general principles of law 
(or internationally recognised general principles of law) are those shared by 
national legal systems worldwide.7 Multilateralism is also present in the case 
law of international investment arbitral tribunals, regardless of whether they 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration—Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT 
Generation, London, Hart, 2009; Salacuse, The Law of International Investment Treaties, 
Oxford, 2010; Avi-Yonah, “National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on 
Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
2003, p. 5; Muchlinski, “The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 
Where Now?”, The International Lawyer, 2000, p. 34.
4 If one considers the distinction between unilateral and non-unilateral actions, 
multilateralism includes any form of potential non-unilateral action, as a result of joint 
activity by two or more States. This would cover the full spectrum of international 
co-operation from thin bilateralism to robust unilateralism. This reflects Keohane’s nominal 
definition of multilateralism, which he defines as: “the practice of co-ordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states”. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for 
Research”, International Journal, 1990, p. 731. However, multilateralism has a qualitative 
dimension as well. In the words of Ruggie: “[…] what is distinctive about multilateralism 
is not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which 
is something that other organizational forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of 
certain principles of ordering relations among those states.” Ruggie, “Multilateralism 
– The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organization, 1992, p. 567. On this point, 
see also Criddle and Fox-Decent, “Mandatory Multilateralism”, The American Journal 
of International Law, 2019, p. 272. In this article, Criddle and Fox-Decent consider whether 
States in international law are always free to choose whether to participate in multilateral 
regimes. Their article suggests this is not always the case; they identify the principles 
supporting mandatory multilateralism and applies the latter to three controversies, namely: 
the South China Sea dispute, the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, 
and Bolivia’s case against Chile in the International Court of Justice. In this article, we 
transpose that question in the context of international investment law.
5 For example, as suggested by Schill, mfn clauses do represent an element of a multilateral 
structure. Schill, cit. supra note 2, p. 121. Indeed, at the very least, depending on the 
words of the treaty, they do imply considering treatment granted to a third State.
6 Judge Read has defined customary international law as ‘the generalization of the practice 
of States’. Fisheries (UK v Norway), Judgment of December 18, 1951, Judge Read, icj Reports, 
1951, p. 191.
7 Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, London, 1927, p. 71. 
According to him: “[…] the actual will of States as evidenced by custom and treaty may, 
when necessary, be supplemented by such rules and principles as correspond to the nature 
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consider bilateral or multilateral investment treaties. Indeed, in most cases, 
they interpret treaty provisions as part of a multilateral system8 – as they often 
refer to arbitral awards issued under the auspices of other treaties as persua-
sive authorities. Perhaps more importantly, multilateralism is present every 
time States act in concert with other States or consider other States’ investors’ 
legitimate interests.9
The same holds true in the context of international law – international 
investment law is one of its sub-fields or disciples (rather than being a branch 
or subordinate of international economic law). However, in that context, it is 
possible to observe a further development. That is, in some instances, mul-
tilateralism has become mandatory. For example, this is the case concerning 
sustainable development or climate change. In these areas, international law 
requires multilateralism. States are under an obligation to co-operate for pur-
poses of achieving or promoting multilateral solutions. However, concerning 
the international investment law context, such a concept is not present. The 
of the legal relations between them, to rules of justice, and to general principles of law; and 
finally, that those general principles of law are for most practical purposes identical with 
general principles of private law.”
8 In the ongoing reforms discussion under uncitral Working Group iii, States agree that 
there is need for consistency in the case law of investment tribunals. In so doing, they 
confirm the multilateral character of the current investment regime. The interpretation of 
similar provisions in a consistent way does imply the existence of a multilateral framework. 
In most cases, this is present in the caselaw, even when there is a disagreement in terms 
of interpretative conclusions. See for example, sgs Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v 
Republic of the Philippines, icsid Case No. arb/02/ 6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections 
to Jurisdiction of January 29, 2004, para. 97. In the words of the Tribunal: “[A]lthough different 
tribunals constituted under the icsid system should in general seek to act consistently 
with each other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in 
accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each bit and 
each Respondent State. Moreover, there is no doctrine of precedent in international law, if 
by precedent is meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision. There is no hierarchy 
of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the 
first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals. It must be initially for the control 
mechanisms provided for under the bit and the icsid Convention, and in the longer term 
for the development of a common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante, to resolve the 
difficult legal questions discussed by the sgs v. Pakistan Tribunal and also in the present 
decision.” On internal and external coherence in the context of international investment 
law, see for example Zarra, “The Issue of Incoherence in Investment Arbitration: Is There 
Need for a Systemic Reform?”, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2018, pp. 137–185.
9 A good example of a multilateral approach is presented by the ongoing reform efforts under 
uncitral Working Group iii, which is considering potential procedural reforms of the 
current investment arbitration regime. On the reform discussions, see generally, langford 
et al., “Special Issue: uncitral and Investment Arbitration Reform: Matching Concerns 
and Solutions”, The Journal of World Investment & Trade, 2020.
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general assumption is that States’ participation in multilateral practises is left 
to their discretion: it is voluntary or consensual. In this article, we question 
that assumption. We consider whether any form of mandatory multilateralism 
is present or could be present, given the developments in international law 
concerning sustainable development.
Multilateralism is not universally accepted: some authors argue that it may 
undermine a libertarian internationalism, which has been prevalent for the 
better part of the second half of the twentieth century.10 Such debates pertain 
particularly to international affairs and discussion of the role of global institu-
tions. We focus our discussion on international investment law and hence will 
not debate the two paradigms.
Section 2 offers a brief review of multilateral experiences in international 
investment law in the 20th century. The purpose of this section is to provide 
an analysis of multilateralism in historical context. In Section 3, we discuss the 
current state of affairs with a view of understanding it in light of the past. In 
Section 4, we discuss the future, and in particular, mandatory multilateralism 
in international law with respect to sustainable development. Here we identify 
the principles, which might justify mandatory multilateral approaches.
Further, we consider whether the principles justifying mandatory multilat-
eralism in international law are equally applicable in the context of interna-
tional investment law. We answer this question in the affirmative. In Section 4, 
we conclude by summarising our argument.
2 Multilateralism’s Historical Trajectories
In this section, we consider multilateralism in international investment law 
in historical context. This section is descriptive and simply aims at tracing the 
trajectories of multilateralism. Our review starts from the period following the 
Second World War. Studying multilateralism before that period is relevant; 
however, it goes well beyond the scope of this article. Also, we simply con-
sider how the interpreters of that period discuss multilateralism. Rather than 
define multilateralism and look for it in history, we do the opposite. We look 
at documents and authors at the time and see how they perceive and discuss 
multilateralism.11
10 See Druzin, and Ikenberry, “The End of the Liberal International Order?”, International 
Law Affairs, 2018.
11 We employ a contextualistic approach along the line of Skinner’s approach, see generally 
Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, History and Theory, 1969, 
p. 3.
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2.1 Multilateralism in the 20th Century
We thus start our analysis in the 1950s, where we find a consensus between 
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries concerning the need and 
desire of economic development for less developed areas.12 The answer to 
such a need was twofold: a flow of capital-exporting States’ public funds;13 
and private international investments, i.e. foreign direct investment (“fdi”). 
At the same time, there appeared to be agreement on the need for an inevi-
table favourable investment climate.14 Brandon summarised this point in his 
lecture to the International Law Conference – held in London and chaired by 
Fitzmaurice on 26 October 1957.15 For the success of investment in underde-
veloped areas, two were the ‘essentials’: “Firstly, an adequate and continuous 
availability of capital – both public and private – from the more developed 
countries, including within this context not only investment capital but also 
managerial and technical skills. Secondly, a welcoming attitude on the part of 
the less developed countries”.16
12 See for example United Nations Secretary-General, Information Concerning International 
Economic Assistance for the Less Developed Countries, UN Doc. E/3047, 1957, para. 5, in 
which “under-developed countries” ”have been defined to include all countries in Africa, 
except the Union of South Africa, in North and South America, except Canada and 
the United States and in Asia, except Japan”. This survey considers the magnitude and 
geographical distribution of countries bilateral assistance to under-developed countries; 
it also indicates each country’s contributions to international governmental agencies 
engaged in the economic assistance to under-developed countries. On the concept of 
economic development in general in this period, see Buchanan and Ellis, Approaches 
to Economic Development, New York, 1955, pp. 3–22; Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness 
and Economic Growth, New York, 1957, pp. 7–14; Higgins, Economic Development, New York, 
1959, pp. 3–24.
13 On public aids, see United Nations Secretary-General, Information Concerning International 
Economic Assistance for the Less Developed Countries, UN Doc. E/3047, 1957. On private 
investment flow, see United Nations Secretary-General, The International Flow of Private 
Capital 1956–1958, UN Doc. E/3021, 1959.
14 Brandon, “Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments”, Grotius Society 
Transactions, 1957, p. 41; Brandon, “Survey of Current Approaches to the Problem”, in 
The Encouragement and Protection of Investment in Developing Countries, International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly Supplement, 1962; Fatouros, “Legal Security for International 
Investment”, in Friedmann and Pugh (eds.), Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment, Boston, 
1959, p. 699; Miller, “Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Conventions”, 
American Journal of International Law, 1959, p. 375; Metzger, “Multilateral Conventions for 
the Protection of Private Foreign Investment”, Journal of Public Law, 1960, p. 133; Fatouros, 
“An International Code to Protect Private Investment”, Toronto University of Law Journal, 
1961, p. 78.
15 See, Brandon, cit. supra note 14, p. 39.
16 Ibid.
mistelis AND RAO
The Italian Review of International and Comparative Law 1 (2021) 59-85
65
Availability of public capital could take the form either of humanitarian/
political aid or proper investment by capital-exporting States. However, the 
emphasis was more on private investment and fdi, of which the former would 
seem only complementary. This was, for example, the position of the United 
Kingdom, according to which: “[…] it is through the investment of privately 
owned funds in the Commonwealth that the United Kingdom has made 
in the past and should continue to make its most valuable contribution to 
Commonwealth Economic development”.17
In these years, the United States and the United Kingdom directed most of 
the investment flow towards Canada and Latin America, which amounted to 
circa 5 billion dollars.18 With almost no increase of investment flow in other 
areas, the discourse focused on how to increase investments towards areas 
like Asia, Africa, the Middle and Far East.19 A number of international bodies 
suggested that a more favourable investment climate would have been neces-
sary to reach such an objective.20 At its Ninth Session on 21 December 1954, 
the UN General Assembly made a number of recommendations to countries 
which wished to attract foreign private capital. For example, according to one 
of them, those countries should:
17 UK Command Paper No. 237 (July 1957), para 17 as cited by Brandon, cit. supra note 14, p. 40.
18 On United States’ investment flow see U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, August 1957; on United Kingdom’s investment flow see Economic and Social 
Council, Financing of Economic Development – The International Flow of Private Capital, 
UN Doc. E/3021, 1957, p. 22.
19 Brandon, cit. supra note 14, p. 41. In the words of the President of the International Finance 
Corporation at its first Annual Meeting: “If private investment is to spread and grow to its full 
potential, it is important, on the one hand, that there should be an increasing understanding 
by the governments and the peoples of the developing countries of what private business is 
and how it operates; and on the other hand, a recognition by business of its responsibilities 
as well as its essential rights. The long-term mutuality of interest needs to be kept in mind 
– the worthy motives and rights of all parties deserve respect. For the country desiring the 
benefits which can flow from vigorous, expanding private business, I consider the prime 
essential to be the development of an attitude of friendliness and co-operation, rather than 
of suspicion and obstruction. This may sound too obvious to mention, yet we see too many 
examples of legislation, regulations and administration which reflect, at the best, mere 
tolerance to business, and frequently actual hindrance.” International Finance Corporation, 
Board of Governors, Summary Proceedings, Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, 
1956, p. 10.
20 See for example, Economic and Social Council, Economic Development of Under-Developed 
Countries, International Flow of Private Capital for The Economic Development of Under-
Developed Countries – Memorandum by Secretary General on Action Taken to Stimulate 
the International Flow of Private Capital, UN Doc. E/2546, 1954, pp. 24–30. This is the case 
for example of the World Bank, p. 24 and the International Monetary Fund, p. 30.
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“re-examine, wherever necessary, domestic policies, legislations and ad-
ministrative practices with a view to improving the investment climate; 
avoid unnecessary burdensome taxation; avoid discrimination against 
foreign investment; facilitate the import by investors of capital goods, 
machinery and component materials needed for new investment; make 
adequate provisions for the remission of earnings and repatriation of 
capital”.21
In line with the recommendation above, the literature of the time pointed out 
a number of risks international investment may encounter in ‘underdevel-
oped’ countries.22 Above all and most prominently, expropriation – direct or 
indirect – without adequate or with inadequate compensation represents the 
main risk.23 As a result of this preoccupation, different solutions were already 
in place.24 Concerning multilateral approaches, we identify discussions at 
different levels on three potential options: an investment code, an insurance 
organisation, and an arbitration convention.25
21 UN General Assembly, Resolution 824(ix)(1954), UN Doc. a/res/824(ix), 1954.
22 As summarised by Fatouros: “Foreign enterprises operating in underdeveloped countries 
are today subject to a high degree of government control, direct or indirect. The entry 
of foreign capital often depends upon the approval of the government of the country of 
investment and the business activities of aliens or of foreign owned corporations are in 
many cases severely limited. The existence of exchange controls makes the repatriation 
of the foreign investor’s capital or earnings difficult or, sometimes, impossible. And the 
possibility of expropriation, of the taking over of the whole enterprise by the government of 
the host country, with inadequate or no compensation, is always present. The businessmen 
of the capital-exporting countries are therefore reluctant to invest in the underdeveloped 
areas, unless the expected profits are high enough to compensate them for the risks they 
are taking. The chief underlying cause of the insecurity of private investment is the general 
political and economic instability which prevails in most underdeveloped countries and is 
one of the causes as well as one of the effects of their underdevelopment”. Fatouros, cit. 
supra note 14, p. 78; see generally Brandon, “Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private 
Foreign Investments”, cit. supra note 14, p. 41; Brandon, “Survey of Current Approaches 
to the Problem”, cit. supra note 14, p. 2; Fatouros, “Legal Security for International 
Investment”, in Friedmann and Pugh (eds.), cit. supra note 14, p. 699; Metzger, cit. 
supra note 14, p. 133.
23 See Brandon, “Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments”, cit. supra 
note 14, p. 43.
24 Solutions included: introducing legislation granting a minimum of legal protection 
and incentives to foreign investors; offering insurance to foreign investors on the part 
of capital-exporting States; concluding bilateral treaties providing for the protection of 
foreign investment. On these solutions, see Fatouros, “Legal Security for International 
Investment”, in Friedmann and Pugh (eds.), cit. supra note 14, p. 699.
25 These three solutions were being discussed together in most cases, by literature and States 
in multilateral settings. On this point, see for example, St John, The Rise of Investor-State 
Arbitration: Politics, Law, and Unintended Consequences, Oxford, 2018, p. 70.
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Concerning an investment code, there were different proposals.26 However, 
the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (“Abs/Shawcross Draft”) was, 
by far, the most influential one.27 This draft results from the efforts of two 
exceptional figures with personal experience in expropriation cases, namely 
Herman Abs28 and Lord Shawcross.29 In particular, the Abs/Shawcross Draft 
incorporated an earlier draft convention prepared by the German Society –  
under the chairmanship of Herman Abs – and another draft convention writ-
ten by a group of lawyers – under the chairmanship of Lord Shawcross.30 
Following their merge – and despite the lack of support from the respective 
governments31 – the Abs/Shawcross Draft officially became an intergovern-
mental Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property in November 
1962,32 when it was submitted to the oecd Council.
Also, it is noteworthy that the draft aspires, as aptly noted by Brandon, to 
codify “the generally accepted rules of international law, and at the same time, 
establish a system of international arbitration which would ensure the rapid 
and final settlement of disputes between sovereign states and private parties”.33
26 Brandon, “Recent Measures to Improve the International Investment Climate”, Journal of 
Public Law, 1960. He discusses different proposals, which are the proposal in the Council of 
Europe of an investment statute and guarantee fund for development in African States; and 
a British Parliamentary Group’s Commission concerning a World Investment Convention.
27 unctad, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium – Volume V, 2000, p. 300. For 
a contemporary commentary of it, see Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Abs-Shawcross 
Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary”, Journal of Public Law, 
1960.
28 Herman Abs, at the time, was the Chairman of Deutsche Bank. An analysis of this figure goes 
beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that historians consider him a very complex 
figure, who has been involved in expropriations both as expropriator and expropriatee. See 
Lothar Gall, “Hermann Josef Abs and the Third Reich: ‘A Man for all Seasons’?”, Financial 
History Review, 1999, pp. 147–202; Harold, The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War 
against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property, Cambridge, 2001; St John, 
cit. supra note 25, p. 79. Abs’ writings on investment protection include, for example: Abs, 
“The Safety of Capital”, in Daniel, Private Investment: The Key to International Industrial 
Development; A Report of the San Francisco Conference, October 14–18, New York, 1957; Abs, 
Proposals for Improving the Protection of Private Foreign Investments, Rotterdam, 1958.
29 Lord Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom at the Nuremberg Trials, has 
served as director at Shell between 1959 and 1972; St John, cit. supra note 25, p. 84. In terms 
of expropriation experience, he was involved as counsel in the Abadan Refinery Case. See 
Mostafa, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, New York, 
1992.
30 Brandon, cit. supra note 26, p. 127.
31 See St John, cit. supra note 25, pp. 80- 88.
32 Ibid., p. 87.
33 Brandon, cit. supra note 26, p. 128.
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The generally accepted rules of international law relevant in this regard 
were: pacta sunt servanda, protection against expropriation without compen-
sation, non-discrimination of aliens. In line with this, the draft provided for 
fair and equitable treatment, protection against expropriation without com-
pensation, most-favoured nation treatment, which had ‘a broad basis in the 
practice of civilized states and the findings of international tribunals’.34 In so 
doing, its purpose is incorporating principles which are, in essence, multilat-
eral, since they derive from State practice.
Further, it aimed at creating a system of neutral arbitration, which would 
have allowed investors to bring claims directly to States.35 In the drafting of 
these provisions, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht’s contributions were particularly sig-
nificant. Above all, the idea of a “right of direct recourse to some international 
remedial processes” is perhaps the most relevant one. Such a notion is line 
with his father’s concept of international law, according to which the indi-
vidual is the ultimate unit of international law.36 Sir Elihu promoted the draft 
before the oecd between 1960–1967. As a result, the oecd transposed his idea 
in oecd Draft.
Despite American opposition and the British more ambiguous hesitance 
towards the draft, the latter was sent to capital-importing States for consulta-
tion purposes.37 In the meantime, Germany and Switzerland’s support for the 
draft started vacillating. They had been simultaneously negotiating Bilateral 
International Treaties (“bit s”) and realised that it was easier to reach the 
desired protection by concluding such treaties.38 By 1965, within the oecd, it 
was clear that bit s would replace the draft. In 1966, States decided to agree on 
a non-binding resolution acknowledging their agreement on the draft’s princi-
ples – with Turkey and Spain abstaining from the resolution.39
34 Abs and Shawcross, “The Proposed Convention to Protect Foreign Investment: A Round 
Table”,’ Journal of Public Law, 1960, p. 119. In general, on the draft, see Schwarzenberger, 
cit. supra note 27, p. 147. On the key role Sir Elihu Lauterpacht played in shaping the 
dispute settlement provisions, see Chernykh, “‘The gust of wind: The unknown role of 
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht in the drafting of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention”,’ in Schill, 
Taims, Hoffman (eds.), International Investment Law and History, Cheltenham, 2018, 
pp. 239–284.
35 However, it should be noted that these provisions were optional. That is, even if the draft 
had been signed and ratified, States would have had to consent to arbitration.
36 See Chernykh, cit. supra note 34, p. 279; Lauterpacht, “‘The World Bank Convention 
on the Settlement of International Investment Disputes”, in Lalive and Freymond 
(eds.), Recueil d’études de droit international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim, 1998, p. 664; 
Lauterpacht, “International Law and Private Foreign Investment”, Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, 1997, p. 274.
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States did not sign and ratify the oecd Draft, hence its failure. However, 
we should note here that, at the time, one could already find discussions in 
the literature on how bit s would create a multilateral treaty system. Brandon’ 
words in 1957 are clear:
“[…] [S]ince these treaties each contain the same general provisions, it is 
submitted that they may be regarded as a method whereby conventional 
international law may be evidenced by a quasi-multilateral treaty system 
composed of a series of bilateral treaties containing substantially similar 
terms and one party common to each”.40
Also, according to Hyde, such treaties might be considered as reflecting inter-
national law rules – i.e. multilateral rules accepted by States. In other words, in 
his view, States included in those treaties what “those parties supposed to be the 
requirement of international law, rather than special concessions or undertak-
ings involving commitments which that law did not call for”.41 Similarly, Boas 
suggested that the oecd Draft’s principles “might serve as a restatement and a 
clarification of the international law on the subject of the treatment of foreign 
property and find their way into bilateral agreements and foreign investment 
laws”.42 Without a doubt, this is what happened in the years to come. Indeed, 
since then, at different points in time, one can see that the oecd Draft has had 
a significant impact on the way States approach and draft their bit s.43
A multilateral investment code did not receive much consensus from States, 
as seen above. On the contrary, States did endorse the creation of a multilateral 
insurance organisation during the 1960s.44 However, such a consensus did not 
lead to the creation of an insurance organisation at the time.45 Only in 1988, 
40 Brandon, “Legal Deterrents and Incentives to Private Foreign Investments” cit. supra note 
14, pp. 45–46.
41 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Boston, 1951, 
p. 714.
42 Boas, “The O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property”, Common 
Market Law Review, 1963, p. 289.
43 See for example, Denza and Brooks, “Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom 
Experience”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, p. 910; Gudgeon, “United 
States Bilateral Investment Treaties”, International Tax & Business Law, 1986, p. 111; Schill, 
cit. supra note 3, p. 39.
44 On States’ consensus on this proposal see St John, cit. supra note 25, p. 99.
45 For a chronological review of the events leading to the creation of miga, see Shihata, 
“Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of icsid and miga”, 
ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, 1986, p. 17.
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172 States concluded the Multilateral Guarantee Agency (“miga”),46 whose 
purpose was “to encourage the flow of investments for productive purposes 
among member countries”. Its insurance covers most investment risks, includ-
ing, for example, expropriations and damages from war and civil unrest. Such a 
convention has been signed and ratified by a significant number of States, and 
it represents a successful multilateral initiative, which has created an interna-
tional insurance framework.
An arbitration convention represents another expression of multilateral-
ism in the 20th century. Contemporary to the attempts concerning a multi-
lateral investment code, discussions were undergoing as to the possibility of 
concluding an arbitration convention. In this sense, one can point to the UN 
Progress Report by the Secretary-General in 1960.47 This report underlines 
some solutions to address the “real problem”, namely the lack of “an effective 
forum in which to enforce [investors’ rights]”.48 In particular, it suggested solu-
tions to this issue “in view of the doubts regarding the practicality of the [oecd 
drafts]”.49 The primary alternative solution was an “international agreement 
limited to arbitration” for investor-state disputes and creating an arbitral insti-
tution. It also referred to the possibility of creating a multilateral framework 
through concluding bilateral treaties. In particular, it noted that:
“Where a government has different policies vis-à-vis investments from 
different capital-supplying countries, bilateral instruments might offer a 
more acceptable solution than multilateral agreements. Indeed the latter 
may conceivably develop from the emergence of a growing network of bi-
lateral agreements or within the framework of a regional organisation”.50
In the literature of the time, Brandon agreed with the report’s considerations, 
considering the possibility of concluding an arbitration convention separately 
46 On the miga, see generally, Alsop, “The World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty 
Agency”, Columbia Journal Transnational Law, 1986; Chatterjee, “The Convention 
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency”, International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 1987; Shihata, cit. supra note 45, p. 17; Shihata, “The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency”, RCADI, Vol. 203, 1986, p. 487; Shihata, “The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (miga) and the Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment”, 
RCADI, Vol. 203, 1987, p. 95; Shihata, “miga and Foreign Investment”, The International 
Lawyer, 1988; Schill, cit. supra note 3, p. 48.
47 United Nations Secretary-General, The Promotion of the International Flow of Private 
Capital – Progress Report, UN Doc. E/3325, 1960, para 200.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., para. 203.
50 Ibid., para. 206.
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from a multilateral agreement a viable solution.51 As for the possibility of cre-
ating a multilateral framework through bilateral treaties, Brandon had some-
how already put forward such a proposal in 1957.52
In this context, the World Bank became involved with an arbitration con-
vention,53 and in 1961, Broches presented the first official proposal.54 Unlike 
the oecd Draft, States received more favourably the idea of an arbitration 
convention under the auspices of the World Bank.55 As a result, in 1965, the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (“icsid Convention”) opened for signature.56
This multilateral convention created the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Dispute (“icsid”), an international organisation and an arbi-
tration institution administering investment arbitrations between investors 
and States. In particular, Broches worked on a system of arbitration with trea-
ty-based consent, domestic-law consent, and contract-based consent.57 By 
including consent to icsid arbitration either in treaties – bilateral and mul-
tilateral – domestic laws and contracts, States would allow investors to bring 
claims against host States.
Furthermore, States have attempted other multilateral approaches to inter-
national investment law at the end of the 20th century. In particular, this was 
the case in two contexts, namely international trade and once again oecd. 
51 Brandon, cit. supra note 26, p. 128.
52 Brandon, cit. supra note 14, p. 45.
53 See St John, cit. supra note 25, pp. 131–140. In particular, St John suggests that the World 
Bank was involved with the idea of an arbitration convention before the Progress Report 
of the UN secretary General in 1960. Here, we should also note that St John has shown 
that the following individuals were involved in drafting the first version of the convention: 
Aron Broches, Georges Delaume, Elihu Lauterpacht, Clifford Hynning, George Haight, L. 
Sandberg, and John Blair.
54 icsid, History of the Convention: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of 
the Convention in English, Volume ii, Part 1, 1970, SecM 61–192.
55 Ibid., SeCM 62-68 p. 13, point 17.
56 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966.
57 On this point see, Parra, The ICSID Convention: A History, Oxford, 2017, p. 51; St John, cit. 
supra note 25, p. 151. On the icsid Convention, see Parra, The ICSID Convention: A History, 
Oxford, 2012; Parra, “Participation in the icsid Convention”, ICSID Review, 2013, pp. 169–
78; Parra, “‘Black’s Bank’ and the Settlement of Investment Disputes”, in Practising Virtue: 
Inside International Arbitration, Caron, Schill, Smutny, and Triantafilou, Oxford, 
2015; Parra, “Remembering Aron Broches”, Investment Claims, 2016; Baltag, “The icsid 
Convention: a successful story – the origins and history of the icsid”, in Baltag (ed.) ICSID 
Convention after Fifty Years: Unsettled Issues, The Netherlands, 2017, pp. 1–24.
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In the context of international trade,58 evidence of these attempts is present 
in the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(“trim s”),59 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“gats”),60 and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“trips”).61 In all these examples, however, the focus on investment matters 
is somewhat limited. Indeed, the trim s is limited to ”investment measures 
related to trade in goods only”.62 The gats, though it facilitates access to for-
eign markets and foreign investment, only applies to matters in case of specific 
commitment by a State.63 The trips limits its protection to only one aspect of 
foreign investment activities, namely intellectual property.64
Further, at the First Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996, it was decided 
not to provide “a mandate for future negotiations”65 on investment matters 
in the wto’s context – despite developed countries’ persistence.66 In reac-
tion to this decision, several developed countries decided to change forum 
for such discussions and went back to the oecd,67 intending to negotiate the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“mai”).68 Despite its similarities with 
bit s in terms of protection offered to investors and dispute settlement provi-
sions, the mai represented another failure of multilateralism in the 20th cen-
tury, partly because the oecd was perceived by some as being controlled by 
58 See generally Schill, cit. supra note 3, p. 50; Dattu, “A Journey from Havana to Paris: 
The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 2000, p. 275.
59 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 
1 January 1995.
60 General Agreement on Trade in Services, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 
1995.
61 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, adopted 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995.
62 Article 138. This agreement has been criticised for this limitation. See Schill, cit. supra note 
3, p. 51; Dattu, cit. supra note 58, p. 291; Civello, “The trim s Agreement: A Failed Attempt 
at Investment Liberalization”, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, 1999, p. 97.
63 Schill, cit. supra note 3, pp. 51–52
64 Ibid.
65 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, wt/min(96)/dec, adopted December 
13, 1996, para. 20.
66 Schill, cit. supra note 3, p. 52; Burt, “Developing Countries and the Framework for 
Negotiations on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization”, American 
University of International Law Review, 1997, p. 1049.
67 Dattu, cit. supra note 58, p. 295.
68 On the mai, see for example, Canner, “The Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, 
Cornell International Law Journal, 1998, pp. 657–682; Rainer, “Towards a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment”, Cornell International Law Journal, 1998, pp. 467–476; Daly, 
“Investment Incentives and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, Journal of 
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developed countries and as not having adequate participation from developing 
countries. Continuing disagreement between States, coupled with opposition 
from the public – expressed by several ngo s – contributed to such a result.69
2.2 Multilateralism in the 21st Century in International Investment Law
Having described multilateralism in the past, here we move to consider mul-
tilateralism at present. In doing so, we are interested in identifying its con-
temporary expression in international investment law and the legal discourse 
concerning it.
As mentioned above, in the 1960s, while discussing a multilateral invest-
ment code, States started concluding bilateral investment treaties, in which 
the protection of investment was the primary goal.70 Since then, they have cre-
ated an investment treaty regime by concluding more than 3500 agreements 
– including bit s, a few plurilateral investment treaties, and free trade agree-
ments providing an investment protection chapter (“iia s”).71 These treaties 
generally contain similar clauses, which resemble the provisions of the oecd 
Draft. In most cases, they also include dispute settlement provisions.
The prevalent use of treaties of a bilateral character, unsurprisingly, has 
raised the question of whether a system or network of international invest-
ment law is conceivable or one has to consider each treaty separately.72 On this 
question, one can identify two competing positions. On the one hand, some 
World Trade, 1998, pp. 5–26; Baumgarten, “The Demise of the Multilateral Investment 
Agreement on Investment”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and 
Policy, 1990, pp. 40–47.
69 Schill, cit. supra note 3, p. 55.
70 Vandevelde, “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements”, University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 2005, p. 166.
71 See the comprehensive list of International Investment Agreements (“iia s”), most of which 
are in force, at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements 
(last accessed on 17 May 2021).
72 On bit s and customary international law, see for example, Lowenfeld, “Investment 
Agreements and International Law”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 2003, p. 123; 
Schwebel, “Investor-State Disputes and the Development of International Law: The 
Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law”, Proceedings of 
the American Society of International Law, 2004, p. 27; Hindelang, “Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate—The Question of Whether bit s 
Influence Customary International Law Revisited”, Journal of World Investment & Trade, 
2004, p. 789; Alvarez, “A bit on Custom”, New York University Journal of International Law 
& Politics, 2009, p. 17; Sornarajah, The International Law On Foreign Investment, Second 
edition, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 205- 213; Yackee, “Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises 
to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 2009, pp. 1550–1552; Porterfield, “An International Common 
Law of Investor Rights?”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 2006, p. 79.
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argue that there is no multilateral order73 and each bilateral or multilateral 
agreement creates a micro-system for its signatories. It is posited that there 
is an “unstructured process of privatised legal entrepreneurship which seeks 
to further a professional interest in developing an extensive, investor friendly, 
regime of bit s.”74 According to this view, there is no evidence that the mass of 
international investment agreements is other than a ”relatively uncoordinated 
system of bilateral, regional and plurilateral instruments”.75 Furthermore, 
according to this view, there are no “generalised rules” concerning interna-
tional investment law. Generalised rules would imply customary rules, and the 
entirety of international investment agreements would not create such rules.
On the other hand, some consider international investment law as a uni-
form system, or at least a network of treaties. The main representative of this 
view is, without a doubt, Professor Schill. In support of this argument, he 
points out that there appears to be an undergoing process towards accepting 
multilateralism as a paradigm.76   In his view, treaty-making and investment 
arbitration case law would support this argument. Concerning treaty-making, 
he refers to an argument he has put forward, for the first time, in his work The 
Multilateralization of International Investment Law. In this book, he points out 
that historically, the similarities between international investment agreements 
result from capital-exporting States’ intention to create a multilateral frame-
work.77 In substance, we can consider this position in terms of continuity with 
the legal discourse contemporary to the oecd Draft discussion. It reflects an 
argument, which, for the first time, the UN Progress Report by the Secretary-
General put forward in 1960, as shown above.
Furthermore, we identify multilateral approaches for purposes of reform-
ing the investment arbitration regime. Such approaches are evident under 
uncitral Working Group iii (“wgiii”). In particular, these solutions are the 
introduction of: a) Multilateral Permanent Court, namely a two-tiered stand-
ing court, which would replace the current system;78 or b) an appellate system, 
73 As a representative of this view, see for example, Muchlinski, “Corporations and the Uses 
of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a ‘Multilateral Legal Order’”, Oñati Socio-
Legal Series, 2011, p. 1.
74 Ibid., p. 1.
75 Ibid., p. 7.
76 Schill, cit. supra note 2, pp. 109–141.
77 Schill, cit. supra note 3, p. 40. Of course it can be argued that Douglas in his book, The 
International Law of Investment Claims, Cambridge, 2009, which is drafted as a restatement 
of international law, effectively also espouses this view.
78 uncitral, Submission from the European Union and its Member States, UN Doc. 
a/cn.9/wg.iii/wp.159/Add.1, 2019.
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which would be hearing/deciding appeals.79 Reform discussions derive from 
the necessity to address different issues. Among them is inconsistency, on 
which wgiii is particularly focussing. The focus is, of course, on unjustified 
inconsistency in cases, for instance, “where the same investment treaty stand-
ard or same rule of customary international law was interpreted differently in 
the absence of justifiable ground for the distinction”.80 The issue of unjusti-
fied inconsistency implies that regardless of the bilateral/multilateral charac-
ter of treaties, one should interpret the same treaty standards and customary 
law rules consistently.81 In doing so, it accepts that such rules and standards 
do relate to each other, hence there should be an inevitable convergence of 
meaning, absent any ground which would suggest otherwise. Finally, the 
authors of this article have also represented the view of the need for multi-
lateral approaches in a Policy Brief prepared for the 2020 T20 which was also 
79 uncitral, Submission from the Government of China, UN Doc. a/cn.9/wg.iii/wp.177, 
2019.
80 uncitral Working Group iii, Report of Working Group iii (Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-fifth session, UN Doc. a/cn.9/935, 2018, para 21.
81 We use here the term consistency as a synonym of coherence. On consistency, see 
Arato, Brown, Ortino, “Parsing and Managing Inconsistency in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement”, Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies Research Paper no. 631, 2020, p. 4; Diel-
Gligor, Towards Consistency in International Investment Jurisprudence: A Preliminary 
Ruling System for ICSID Arbitration, Leiden, 2017, p. 105; Brower and Sharpe, “Multiple 
and Conflicting International Arbitral Awards”, Journal of World Investment, 2003, p. 211; 
Crawford, “Similarity of Issues in Disputes Arising under the Same or Similarly Drafted 
Investment Treaties”, in Gaillard and Banifatemi (eds.), Precedent in International 
Arbitration, New York, 2008, pp. 97–103; Kaufmann-Kohler, “Is Consistency A Myth?”, 
in Gaillard and Banifatemi (eds.), Precedent in International Arbitration, New York, 
2008; Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: Challenges and Solutions, 
Utrecht, 2008, pp. 35–100; Schreuer, “Coherence and Consistency in International 
Investment Law”, in Echandi and Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International Investment 
Law Cambridge, 2013, pp. 391–402; Dolzer, “Perspectives for Investment Arbitration: 
Consistency as a Policy Goal?”, in Echandi and Sauvé (eds.), Prospects in International 
Investment Law Cambridge, 2013, pp. 403–410; Harhay, “Investment Arbitration in 2021: 
A Look to Diversity and Consistency”, Southwestern Journal of International Law, 2011, pp. 
89–102; Reinish, “The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The 
Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More Effective System? Some Reflections from 
the Perspective of Investment Arbitration”, in Buffard (ed.), International Law between 
Universalism and Fragmentation, Leiden, 2008 p. 107; Schreuer, “Revising the System of 
Review for Investment Awards”, BIICL Paper 1, 2009, pp. 1–8; Tams, “An Appealing Option? 
The Debate about an icsid Appellate Structure”, Essays in Transnational Economic Law, 
2006, pp. 17–23; Arato et al., Working Group No 3: Lack of Consistency and Coherence in 
the Interpretation of Legal Issues: Concept Paper on Issues of ISDS Reform, 2019, p. 1 ff.; 
Ridi, “Approaches to External Precedent: The Invocation of International Jurisprudence 
in Investment Arbitration and wto Dispute Settlement”, in Gáspár-Szilágyi, Behn 
Langford, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 121–148.
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endorsed and submitted to the G20.82 In particular, the policy brief advocates 
the need for a holistic reform agenda and multilateral consensus building, sup-
ported by a new institution.
3 Mandatory Multilateralism in International Investment Law
In this section, we answer the question set at the beginning. That is, whether 
we can identify mandatory multilateralism in the field of international invest-
ment law, given that in most instances multilateralism appears to be con-
sensual and voluntary. Before answering such a question, we need to define 
mandatory multilateralism. In particular, we refer to “multilateralism” from 
an international coordination perspective, which includes more than three 
States. “Mandatory” implies a lack of discretion on the States’ part.
In our view, mandatory multilateralism has always been present in the field 
of international investment law to a certain extent, even if not in a manifest 
fashion. In support of this argument, we rely on history, and in particular on the 
multilateral principles under customary international law underlying interna-
tional investment agreements States have started concluding in the 1960s. In 
our view, those principles – mandatory insofar as part of customary interna-
tional law – are clear manifestations of creeping mandatory multilateralism.
Furthermore, in international law, it is possible to identify mandatory 
multilateralism in other areas. We briefly discuss mandatory multilateralism 
concerning sustainable development. We argue that international law might 
require mandatory multilateralism in international investment law with 
respect to matters concerning sustainable development. A limitation would 
apply here: we do not discuss the requirements of this mandatory multilateral-
ism. We focus more on the conceptual foundations of this argument.
3.1 Mandatory Multilateralism in International Investment Law – 
Customary International Law Rules
Here we consider more specifically whether we can identify mandatory mul-
tilateralism in international investment law. We answer this question in the 
affirmative by drawing attention to past and present practices.
82 See, Mistelis et al., “Reforming investor-state dispute settlement and promotion of trade 
and investment co-operation”, G20 Insights, November 22, 2020 | Last updated: December 
10, 2020, available at https://www.g20-insights.org/policy_briefs/reforming-investor-state-
dispute-settlement-and-promotion-of-trade-and-investment-co-operation/ (last accessed 
on 20 May 2021).
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First, mandatory multilateral rules constitute the backbones of the inter-
national investment law regime. It was so even before States started conclud-
ing international investment agreements.83 In support of this argument, we 
consider the Abs/Shawcross Draft insofar it included mandatory multilateral 
rules. Those rules were: pacta sunt servanda, protection against expropriation 
without compensation, non-discrimination of aliens and their property. For 
instance, when Brandon examined the draft, he concluded that it included 
those principles.84 Similarly, Schwarzerbenger’s critical commentary consid-
ered to what extent the draft reflected customary international law. In his view, 
it included the principles referred above. For example, Article I incorporated 
the definition of property rights in international law.85 Also, it included the 
minimum standard of treatment under international law – expressed by “the 
positive obligation to ensure the ‘most constant protection and security’ for 
property.”86 Furthermore, Article ii reflected the principle of pacta sunt serv-
anda. In international law, States are under an obligation to comply with their 
undertakings towards investors.87 Article iv included the protection against 
expropriation without compensation.88
83 Admittedly, in the context of the United Nations General Assembly, during the 1970s, there 
were attempts to exclude the element of compensation for expropriation from customary 
international law. However, these attempts were unsuccessful. On this point, see, for 
example, Alvarez, cit. supra note 72, p. 39; Schill, cit. supra note 3, pp. 37-38.
84 See Brandon, cit. supra note 26, pp. 129–130. Similarly, he reached the same conclusions 
with respect to the reports of the Council of Europe and the British Parliamentary Group for 
World’s Government Commission; Schwarzenberger, cit. supra note 27, p. 147.
85 Schwarzenberger, cit. supra note 27, p. 152; for discussions on expropriation at the time, 
see for example Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law, Cambridge, 1959.
86 Schwarzenberger, cit. supra note 27, p. 153.
87 Schwarzenberger, cit. supra note 27, pp. 154–155. Of course, on this point, he noted 
that the draft did not provide for the exhaustion of local remedies, which it represented 
a derogation from international law. However, this consideration does not exclude that, in 
essence, Article ii reflected the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
88 Schwarzenberger, cit. supra note 27, p. 156. Cheng, General Principles of Law, London, 
1953, p. 37. Here we have to note that Schwarzenberger correctly pointed out the omission of 
the “public interest” element in the provisions concerning expropriation under international 
law.
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As we already alluded to, States did not sign the Abs/Shawcross Draft – 
which became the oecd Draft89 – for a variety of reasons.90 However, the 
oecd Draft’s failure did not jeopardise or undermine the existence of the prin-
ciples above. Brandon considered this point when commenting on the Abs/
Shawcross Draft. He specifically referred to capital-exporting States’ fear of 
jeopardising customary law rules by negotiating them in a multilateral con-
vention. In his view, that was not an issue. In his words:
“First, there would be no question of negotiating customary rules. They 
exist and are generally accepted. Second, since the object of the exer-
cise is to improve the investment climate, if investors would prefer to see 
the customary rules conventionalized-and there is no objection from the 
standpoint of the capital-importing countries-why should the govern-
ments of the industrialised countries not agree?”91
Indeed, when States realised that they would not sign a multilateral treaty, they 
also considered whether such a failure would have impacted on the relevant 
customary international law;92 the acceptance in principle of the draft was 
aimed at avoiding any such consequences.93
89 On the relationship between the Abs/Shawcross draft and the oecd Draft, see Chernykh, 
cit. supra note 34, pp. 280–284. As already mentioned, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht was involved 
in the work of the oecd Draft as well. For example, he answered a question as to whether 
a limited acceptance of the draft would have weakened the customary international law 
concerning foreign investments. He replied that: “I do not think concern about the effect of 
non-acceptance of the relevant rules of customary international law should be allowed to 
influence the decision whether or not to open the Convention for ratification. To my mind, 
considerations which are so theoretical or, if real, so marginal in their effect, should not be 
permitted to obscure the undoubted advantage of extending the network of compulsory 
jurisdiction links between States in matters affecting property. In my estimate, it would be a 
positive, even though slight, gain if the Convention were to become operative between even 
as few as two States”, cit. supra note 34, p. 283.
90 See Brandon, cit. supra note 26, p. 128.
91 Amongst them was for example, the fear of being on the receiving end of claims before 
arbitral tribunals – which was expressed by UK officials with respect to the Shawcross draft. 
See St John, cit. supra note 24, p. 86. Also, the US did not welcome the focus of the draft on 
substance, See icsid, cit. supra note 54, p. 16, point 17.
92 St John, cit. supra note 25, p. 95, where she referred to a 1963 letter to the Swiss Government 
arguing that if the Draft failed, it would degrade investment protection because it could be 
concluded that the draft did not codify existing norms of international law.
93 Ibid. For some consideration on the relationship between customary international law and 
U.N. resolutions see for example, Roucounas, “Engagements parallèles et contradictoires”, 
RCADI, Vol. 206, 1987, paras. 343–347.
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These rules are part of customary international law; hence, they are of a man-
datory character. They apply regardless of their inclusion in a treaty.94 For this 
reason, they fall within the realm of the prohibition of unilateralism.95 States 
cannot derogate from them unless otherwise agreed in a treaty. This conclu-
sion is in line, for example, with Kelsen’s idea of sovereign equality – which is 
the cornerstone of the international legal order – according to which “[s]over-
eignty in the sense of international law can mean only the legal authority or 
competence of a State limited and limitable only by international law and not 
by the national law of another State”.96 As a corollary of their mandatory char-
acter, States are under an obligation to coordinate their policies with respect 
to those principles.97 In our view, this instance would clearly represent a form 
of mandatory multilateralism from an international co-operation perspective.
Furthermore, States have incorporated these mandatory multilateral rules 
in a growing and evolving international investment agreement network – 
either in bilateral or multilateral treaties. Despite going beyond the scope of 
this article, in our view, the argument above also reinforces the idea of mul-
tilateralism as an ordering paradigm in international investment law, which 
Schill convincingly argues.98 Indeed, focusing on the underlying principles of 
international agreements, the logical conclusion is that there is a mandatory 
multilateral framework under relevant customary international law norms. 
Concerning optional treaty standards – such as national treatment or most- 
favoured-nation clauses – the conclusion is similar: those provisions derive 
from certain general principles. This consideration allows assimilating, from a 
conceptual perspective, different provisions across multiple treaties.
94 See for example, Akehurst, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1974–5, pp. 24–26. For a critical view on this, see Bradley and Gulati, 
“Withdrawing from International Custom”, Yale Law Journal, 2010, p. 202. In response to 
Bradley and Gulati, see for example, Brilmayer and Tesfalidet, “Treaty Denunciation 
and ‘Withdrawal’ from Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous 
Consequences”, Yale Law Journal, 2011.
95 See for example, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark 
/ Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, para. 63. In the words of the 
icj: “[…] by their very nature, [customary rules] must have equal force for all members of 
the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral 
exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its favour”.
96 Kelsen, “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International 
Organization”, Yale Law Journal, 1944, p. 208.
97 On the hierarchy of international law norms, see for example’ Roucounas, cit. supra note 
93, at paras. 275–279 and more in general Roucounas, A Landscape of Contemporary 
Theories of International Law, Leiden, 2019, at pp. 316 and 358.
98 Schill, cit. supra note 2.
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Of course, different wording might correctly lead to varying interpretations 
of these provisions. However, it does not exclude the existence of a multilat-
eral network of principles of international investment law and an ensuing dia-
logue amongst treaties.99 The current reform discussions under the auspices of 
uncitral Working Group iii confirm this argument. Indeed, States consider 
consistency fundamental concerning the same treaty standards and customary 
international law rules’ interpretation. Thus, they impliedly accept the exist-
ence of this multilateral framework of principles – either under international 
law or treaties – and the existence of a dialogue amongst those instruments.
3.2 Mandatory Multilateralism in International Investment Law 
Concerning Sustainable Investment
Most pertinently, international law, in some instances, would require manda-
tory multilateralism. This consideration applies to different areas, of which we 
have selected one. In particular, we refer to sustainable development. In inter-
national investment law, the legal discourse has been increasingly focussing on 
it, for good reasons.
Intending to contribute to the debate, in this section, we consider whether, 
from a conceptual perspective, it is arguable that international law requires 
mandatory multilateralism beyond customary international law norms in 
the field of international investment law with respect to sustainable develop-
ment. In order to avoid any possible doubt, we refer to mandatory multilat-
eralism from an international co-operation perspective. That is, the question 
is whether international law requires States to co-operate and thus prohibits 
unilateralism. We attempt to argue that since international law requires man-
datory multilateral co-operation between States on matters concerning sus-
tainable development, such a co-operation would be equally mandatory in 
international investment.
Our analysis’s starting point is the increasing trend – in international 
investment law – to recognise the relevance of sustainable development 
and environmental protection. This trend is evident in the literature,100 
99 See, for example, Parkerings-Compagniet as v. Lithuania, icsid Case No. arb/05/8, 
Award of September 11, 2007, para. 367, where the Tribunal observed, for example, that 
the principle of non-discrimination is underlying National treatment and Most-Favoured-
Nation Treatment.
100 See for example, Schrijver, “The Rise of Sustainable Development in International 
Investment Law”, in Quayle, Yearbook of International Law, 2020, pp. 297–314; Beharry 
and Kuritzky, “Going Green: Managing the Environment through International 
Investment Arbitration”, American University International Law Review, 2015, p. 383; 
Butler and Subedi, “The Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a 
World Investment Organisation?”, Netherlands International Law Review, 2017, pp. 43–72; 
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treaties,101 and case law.102 For example, Baltag aptly points out that the reform 
of the international investment regime is underway.103 In particular, she notes 
that there is a shift in recent treaties from investment protection towards 
investment regulation.104 This change can take different forms. For example, 
as noted by Chi, States can incorporate sustainable development provisions 
in the preamble of international investment treaties, both substantive and 
procedural.105 The relevance of these measures is undeniable. Indeed, the 
Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development in International Investment Law: Normative 
Incompatibility, System Integration and Governance Implications, London, 2018; icc, 
“Business Charter for Sustainable Development—Business Contributions to the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals”, Doc. No 213/18-13, 2015; Marley, “The Environmental 
Endangerment Finding in International Investment Disputes”, New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, 2014, p. 1003; Sands and Peel, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, Cambridge, 4th edition, 2018. Sands, “International 
Courts and the Application of the Concept of Sustainable Development”, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 1999, p. 389; Sands, “International Courts and 
the Application of the Concept of Sustainable Development”, Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law Online, 1999; Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling 
Policy and Principle, London, Third edition, 2016; Vasani and Allen, “No Green without 
More Green: The Importance of Protecting fdi through International Investment Law to 
Meet the Climate Change Challenge”, European Investment Law, 2020, pp. 3–39.
101 See for example, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between EU and 
Canada (‘ceta’), adopted 30 October 2016; Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (‘cptpp’), adopted 8 March 2018, entered into force 30 
December 2018, see Chapters 20 on environment and 23 on development.
102 Cases related to sustainable development, for example, are: Bear Creek Mining 
Corporation v. Republic of Peru, icsid Case No. arb/14/2, Award of November 30, 2017; 
Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l v. Kingdom of Spain, 
icsid Case No. arb/13/36, Award of May 4, 2017; Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, icsid Case No arb/08/5, Decision on Liability of December 14, 2012; Interim 
Decision on Environmental Counterclaim of August 11, 2015; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de 
Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, icsid Case 
No. arb/07/26, Award of December 8, 2016; Churchill Mining plc and Planet Mining Pty 
Ltd v. Republic of Indonesia, icsid Case No arb/12/14 and 12/40, Award of December 6, 
2016; Pac Rim Cayman llc v. Republic of El Salvador, icsid Case No arb/09/12, Award of 
October 14, 2016; Philip Morris Brands sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, icsid Case No. arb/10/7, Award of July 8, 2016; 
Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, icsid Case 
No arb(af)/11/2, Award of April 4, 2016; William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, 
Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, pca 
Case No 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of March 17, 2015; Metal-Tech Ltd. v. 
The Republic of Uzbekistan, icsid Case No. arb/10/3, Award of October 4, 2003.
103 Baltag, “From investment promotion and protection to investment regulation”, Columbia 
fdi Perspectives, 2020, p. 1.
104 Ibid., p. 2.
105 Chi, cit. supra note 100, Part 2.
multilateral principles in a bilateral world
The Italian Review of International and Comparative Law 1 (2021) 59-85
82
international investment law regime must “go beyond mere investment/inves-
tor protection to a more comprehensive set of objectives”.106
However, here we do not intend to focus on how desirable these objectives 
are. Instead, we want to explore whether it is arguable that international law 
does require States to co-operate in international investment law with respect 
to matters concerning sustainable development. The first point we should 
note is that there are cases in which international law requires co-operation 
between States. This is the case, for example, with resources, which interna-
tional law considers “commons”. The concept of global commons applies in 
different contexts, such as “common areas”, ”common heritage”, or “common 
concerns” of mankind.107 For example, high seas under the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (“unclos”) are commons. As a result, States are under 
an obligation to co-operate for the conservation and management of living 
resources in the high seas; and establish, through negotiation, multilateral 
frameworks to guarantee the sustainable exploitation of fisheries and living 
resources.108 The concept of common areas also concerns outer space, which 
includes the moon and other celestial bodies. In light of this, States, under the 
Treaty on Outer Space109 must co-operate by giving due regard to the “corre-
sponding interests of all States”.110
Furthermore, we should note that under the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development,111 States have to co-operate “in a spirit of global partnership 
to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosys-
tems”. Similarly, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provides 
the “widest possible co-operation by all countries and their participation in an 
106 In a recent policy paper, we have submitted that the reformed international investment 
system should cover “sustainable development, dispute prevention, environmental 
protection, and protecting sme investments”. See, Mistelis et al., “Reforming Investor-
State Dispute Settlement and Promotion of Trade And Investment Co-operation”, G20 
Insights, 2020, note 82.
107 On this point see Criddle and Fox-Decent, cit. supra note 4, p. 280; Brunnée, 
“Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern”, in Bodansky, Brunnée 
and Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook Of International Environmental Law, Oxford, 2007 
p. 550; Brunnée, “International Environmental Law: Rising to the Challenge of Common 
Concern?”, Proceedings of the 114th ASIL Annual Meeting, 2006, pp. 307–310.
108 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994, Art. 118.
109 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted 27 January 1967, entered 
into force 10 October 1967, Art. ii.
110 Ibid., Art. ix.
111 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted 14 June 1992, UN Doc. 
a/conf.151/26, Principle 7.
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effective and appropriate international response”.112 Such a duty of co-opera-
tion finds support in the international jurisprudence of the icj with respect to 
sustainable development as well.113
To the extent that sustainable investment is interwoven with international 
investment – which is directly related to economic development114 – in prin-
ciple, one could argue that the same duty of co-operation might arise in inter-
national investment law. To explain and support this view, we employ Criddle 
and Fox-Decent’s interpretative theory concerning mandatory multilateralism 
in international law.115 In their article, Mandatory Multilateralism, they argue 
that manifestations of mandatory multilateralism – such as the ones we have 
briefly considered above – can be explained by the principles of sovereign 
equality and joint stewardship. The corollary of this argument would be that 
mandatory multilateralism is “an emerging institutional feature of interna-
tional law that brings the institutions of international law into the deepest 
conformity possible with its fundamental normative principles”.116
In particular, concerning common resources and sustainable develop-
ment more in general, they point out the relevance of the concept of joint 
stewardship. This idea provides “a framework for apprehending cases where 
the care of a common concern is expressly consigned (usually via treaty) to 
multiple parties”.117 In its essence, this concept applies when global commons 
112 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 
1994.
113 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, 
icj Reports, 1997, p. 78, para. 141; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Netherlands and Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark), Judgment of 20 
February 1969, icj Reports, 1969, pp. 46–47, para. 85; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v. Uruguay.), Judgment of 20 April 2010, icj Reports, 2010, para. 184.
114 Ibid., Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, para. 140. The icj did not consider the relationship 
between investment and sustainable development. However, it did consider the 
relationship between economic development and sustainable development. In the words 
of the icj: “Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effects 
upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the 
risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions 
at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, 
set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms 
have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not 
only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities 
begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.”
115 Criddle and Fox-Decent, cit. supra note 4, p. 280.
116 Ibid., p. 287.
117 Ibid., p. 298.
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are at stake and its function is two-fold: it prohibits a State unilateral asser-
tion over a global common and it requires States to negotiate in good faith 
with regards to its collective use.118 Accordingly, for the purpose of arguing 
that international law requires mandatory multilateralism in international 
investment law, we would need to identify multilateral treaties on global 
commons – which might enter in contact or interaction with international 
investment law. For example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change119 – which we mentioned above – would fall within that definition. 
Therefore, it would be arguable, in principle, that international law might 
require in certain cases a duty to co-operate in international investment law – 
unless we want to deny the potential relationship/interference between 
investments and common resources.
4 Concluding Remarks
Multilateralism, very much like pluralism of norms, is embedded in the archi-
tecture of international investment law. Even before the conclusion of inter-
national investment agreements, it was already there – in few, limited but 
well defined, mandatory multilateral rules. During the 1960s, multilateralism’s 
dimensions involved the project of a multilateral treaty on investment pro-
tection, an investment insurance organisation, and an arbitration convention 
– yet only the last two survived. Simultaneously, those few multilateral rules 
were being incorporated in bilateral treaties, which States considered apt to 
replace a multilateral treaty.
During the 1970s, the existence of those few mandatory multilateral rules 
was contested but eventually confirmed. Between 1980–2000, other attempts 
to create a multilateral treaty were made, yet they failed. By 2010, multilateral-
ism was a paradigm that would assist international lawyers and academics in 
making sense of a system constituted of norms deriving by general principles 
but contained in different treaties – with potentially different wording. In 2021, 
multilateral approaches to procedural aspects appear the only viable solutions 
to ensure consistency of interpretation of those provisions.
In sketching multilateralism’ conceptual change, this article has tested a 
general assumption on multilateralism. That is, States’ participation in mul-
tilateral practises is left to their discretion: it is primarily consensual and 
118 Ibid.
119 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 12 
December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016.
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voluntary. This article has questioned that assumption and pointed out that 
a form of mandatory multilateralism has always been present in international 
investment law, at the very least as a creeping mandatory multilateralism. 
Then, we considered whether it is possible to argue and justify the extension of 
mandatory multilateralism, whether creeping or outright, to sustainable devel-
opment matters in international investment law. We have attempted to answer 
that question in the affirmative by employing Criddle and Fox-Decent theory 
on mandatory multilateralism in international law.
At the outlook of this article, we also wish to identify – as areas for future 
research – a few other prominent manifestations of emerging or creeping man-
datory multilateralism in international investment law. These would include, 
inter alia, the multilateral dimension of the rule of law, international condem-
nation of corruption and bribery, and the requirement that business respect 
human rights and the safeguarding of the right to state to regulate. The very 
fact that mandatory multilateralism is creeping does not undermine its exist-
ence or significance: it merely presents the surmountable challenge of having 
to engage in the intellectual and practical exercise of identifying its parameters 
and content. At the same time, mandatory multilateralism does not require 
universal acceptance of its content: it suffices to establish that States, interna-
tional organisations and other stakeholders voluntarily accept the existence of 
the multilateral norms and make steps to either consensual follow them or at 
the very least not breach them.
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